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Abstract
We propose and estimate, using Bayesian techniques, a Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium model featuring search and matching frictions with redistributive productivity
shocks – which account for fluctuations in the distribution of income across factors of produc-
tion. We first find supporting evidence that the model is able to replicate cyclical properties
of labour market variables. We then disentangle two endogenous sources of labour market
amplification: (i) deep habits and (ii) the replacement ratio. The latter appears to be a
powerful endogenous amplification mechanism given the shock structure of the model. As
far as the exogenous amplification is concerned, labour market variability can be largely ex-
plained by redistributive innovations. Finally, contrary to Total Factor Productivity shocks,
redistributive shocks increase total hours.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence shows that labour market variables, such as vacancies and unemployment,
display high volatility over the business cycle. In a seminal study, Shimer (2005) shows that
the standard search and matching model driven purely by Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
innovations cannot match the volatility of labour market variables as observed in the US data.
This lack of amplification is known in the literature as the unemployment volatility puzzle. A
large number of endogenous mechanisms, together with an alternative set of innovations, have
been proposed in order to improve the performance of the standard search and matching model.
This study is an attempt to further understand the dynamic properties of the labour market.
To this end, we develop and estimate, using Bayesian techniques, a Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model featuring diminishing returns to the factors of production,
search and matching frictions, efficient Nash bargaining and nominal price rigidities. Two main
modelling devices are new to our model. First, the DSGE model features a redistributive
innovation following Ríos-Rull and Santaeulália-Llopis (2010). This shock represents a way to
allow time variations in the distribution of income across factors of production, in line with
empirical evidence. Second, our search and matching model introduces two endogenous sources
of amplification: deep habits in private consumption and high total replacement ratios. We focus
on these sources of amplification because they are relatively analytically tractable into a general
equilibrium setting.
Our paper addresses the following research questions: What is the most important exoge-
nous shock for explaining the volatility of labour market variables? And is there evidence for
endogenous amplification mechanisms working alongside structural shocks?
The purpose of our study is not only to empirically validate, through the lenses of the model,
the role of endogenous amplification mechanisms but primarily to quantify the extent to which
exogenous shocks matter for amplification. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first
to estimate, in the context of a DSGE model featuring search and matching frictions, the role
of redistributive innovations. We argue that TFP innovations explain only a small part of the
conditional variance of labour market variables over shorter horizons even after accounting for
a set of real frictions that have the potential to improve the performance of the standard model.
Redistributive shocks, instead, explain large part of the volatility of labour market variables at
both short and long horizons.
By focusing purely on standard TFP shocks, a large number of studies has attempted to
provide a solution to the unemployment volatility puzzle. None of the proposed solutions on
their own has been fully satisfactory and subject to scrutiny. The most intuitive solution has
been to introduce wage rigidities for newly hired workers in order to generate amplification in
labour quantities. Microeconometric evidence by Pissarides (2009) and Haefke et al. (2013)
suggests however that wages for newly hired workers are more cyclical than average wages.
Based on this evidence, we assume that wages for newly hired workers can be negotiated period
by period at no cost.1 Another approach to solve the anomaly of the standard model is taken
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), where a simple calibration exercise is conducted in an
otherwise standard search and matching model. Their calibration consists of setting the value
of non-market activity close to the value of search to the worker. However, Costain and Reiter
(2008) point out that this calibration implies an implausibly large elasticity of unemployment
to unemployment benefits. An alternative approach has been proposed by Di Pace and Faccini
1See Hall (2005a) and Shimer (2005) for a discussion on real wage rigidities. Gertler et al. (2008), Gertler
and Trigari (2009) and Blanchard and Gali (2010) introduce this idea into general equilibrium models to show
that the model can match the second moments of the data. Christoffel and Kuester (2008) show that, although
nominal wage rigidities play an important role for restoring the wage channel in models featuring right-to-manage
bargaining, it is the size of profits that lies at the source of amplification and not the assumption of nominal wage
rigidities per se. The list of solutions to the unemployment volatility puzzle is not exhaustive and includes studies
such as Reiter (2007), Guerrieri (2008), Quadrini and Trigari (2008), Gomes (2011), Menzio and Shi (2011), Robin
(2011), Alves (2012), Petrosky-Nadeau (2013), amongst others.
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(2012), where it is argued that, so long as final good prices are flexible, the standard search
and matching model augmented with deep habits in consumption can solve the puzzle through
endogenous fluctuations in mark-ups. Their study generates highly cyclical mark-ups and wages
and their solution is only applicable to highly habitual economies.
The limited role of TFP innovations calls for a re-assessment of the role of frictions in
models with a wider set of productivity innovations. A large number of studies has attempted
to improve the performance of the standard search and matching model by simply introducing
other sources of exogenous fluctuations into the standard model. Rotemberg (2008) shows
that price-elasticity innovations, which can be understood as redistributive innovations between
firm’s profits and factor payments, have the ability to match the volatility of labour market
variables when introduced into a search and matching featuring imperfect competition in the
goods market. However, these innovations have the following drawbacks: i) price-elasticity
innovations are highly controversial because they entail large shifts in the economy’s competitive
structure over shorter horizons (see Chari et al., 2007) and ii) the size of the innovations needed
to match relative volatilities, as observed by Rotemberg (2008), which can be interpreted as a
very large shift in the competitive structure in the goods market. A later study by Krause et al.
(2008) quantitatively validates Rotemberg’s claim but shows that matching efficiency shocks are
important sources of variation in labour market variables.2 Building on the work by Gertler et al.
(2008), Furlanetto and Groshenny (2013) show that matching efficiency innovations play a minor
role in explaining unemployment fluctuations in “normal times”, while demand shocks – such
as investment-specific and risk premium shocks – as well as bargaining and mark-up shocks are
important sources of unemployment fluctuations. A study by Monacelli et al. (2011) highlights
the importance of credit shocks in accounting for the observed swings in unemployment during
the current crisis. A recent analysis by Zanetti (2013) uncovers that innovations to the separation
rate are nearly the most important sources of exogenous variation but finds little role for credit
market innovations.
Ríos-Rull and Santaeulália-Llopis (2010) introduce another type of productivity shock, which
differs from the standard TFP innovation, that play a key role for matching the counter-cyclical
fluctuations in the labour share that are present in the data.3 Due to a change in their relative ef-
ficiency of factors, redistributive productivity innovations give rise to a re-allocation of resources
between factors of production. Their modelling strategy adopts a standard Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology that exhibits constant returns to scale at the goods level but exhibits diminishing returns
to both labour and capital.4 Productivity innovations are decomposed into standard TFP inno-
vations and redistributive innovations in order to analyse the amplification properties of total
hours. Innovations that change relative efficiency of the factors of production have the potential,
by changing the scale of production of the labour input, to shift the labour demand schedule
and to explain a great deal of the variation in total hours. This approach has not yet been quan-
2However, their study is somewhat silent about the standard deviation of mark-up shocks needed to match
the volatility of labour market variables.
3A few explanations have been sought to explain this counter-cyclical pattern in the labour share. One
explanation is that firms insure workers against income fluctuations (Boldrin and Horvath, 1995; Gomme and
Greenwood, 1995). In bad times workers receive an insurance payout, while in good times they pay into the
insurance. Fluctuations in the labor share are the result of a risk-sharing arrangement between firms and workers.
This state-contingent arrangement can be private but can also take place through public transfers of resources
between workers and firms. Another explanation given by Choi and Ríos-Rull (2009) and Cantore et al. (2013)
is to introduce of a more general production process, i.e. a normalised factor-augmenting CES technology. Shao
and Silos (2008) and Colciago and Rossi (2013) show that endogenous firm entry in a model with search and
matching frictions can generate, through fluctuations in mark-ups, a fall in the labour share that overshoots in
line with the data. This mechanism works only when mark-ups are largely volatile.
4The idea of introducing decreasing returns in labour is not new to settings with labour market frictions. Krause
et al. (2008) develop and estimate a New Keynesian model featuring a production function with decreasing returns
to scale. Building on this work, Di Pace and Faccini (2012) show that decreasing returns coupled with deep habits
in consumption à la Ravn et al. (2006), have the potential to change the incentives for vacancy posting after a
TFP innovation. Michaillat (2012) also assumes decreasing returns technology and wage rigidities.
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titatively assessed in models featuring search and matching frictions. We believe that doing
an exercise of the sort is key because search and matching models display an endogenous and
time-varying labour share even when redistributive shocks are absent. Our study is therefore an
attempt to bridge this gap so as to measure the extent to which redistributive shocks can help
match the volatilities of unemployment and vacancies with the data.
The model we present in this study differs from Ríos-Rull and Santaeulália-Llopis (2010) in
that we not only include both a larger set of frictions and shocks but also estimate the main
structural parameters of our model using Bayesian techniques. A redistributive innovation in
our model can be interpreted a transfer of resources between factors of production due to shifts
in their relative efficiency. Shocks to the relative productivity of factors have the potential to
explain the amplification of labour market variables through shifts in the labour demand schedule
because they change firm’s incentive to hire at the margin by increasing the marginal revenue
product of labour directly. Firms are therefore able to employ more workers and to pay higher
hourly wages by re-allocating resources towards workers to compensate them because of their
higher relative efficiency. This type of exogenous innovations can generate output fluctuations
through changes to the labour demand schedule at shorter horizons because - due to our timing
assumption - while labour can adjust immediately, capital can only adjust with a lag. A positive
redistributive innovation, as introduced in our model, has therefore a large re-scaling effect in
labour but a substantially smaller de-scaling effect on capital.
The study of the fluctuations in the labour share has been linked to the behaviour of inflation.
Galí et al. (2001) have argued for a casual relationship between the behaviour of the labour share
and inflation in the Euro area. Their study claims that the fall in inflation coincided with that
of the labor share over the period of the Great Moderation. The standard New Keynesian
model proposes a relationship between inflation and marginal costs but the absence of data
on real marginal costs has motivated the use of the labor share of income as a proxy in a
number of empirical applications. There is however no unified measure of the labour share
that can be used in economic application and the different measures are subject to considerable
measurement errors. Moreover, as shown by Krause et al. (2008), in the presence of search and
matching frictions, the real marginal cost of production depends on a frictional component as
well as the labour share. For this reason, we argue that unemployment, vacancies and inflation
can be somewhat informative of the labour share. According to Pissarides (2009) and Sontag
and van Rens (2013), wages for newly hired workers are more cyclical relative to average wages.
The resulting labour share is equal to the ratio between wage income to newly hired workers
and output in model featuring labour market frictions as opposed to the ratio between average
wage income and output in model featuring Walrasian labour markets.
Our main findings are as follows. First, the model is able to generate volatilities in unem-
ployment and vacancies so as to match the empirical moments in the US data. As far as the
exogenous amplification is concerned, we find that the labour market variability can be mainly
explained by redistributive innovations, while TFP innovations play a larger role at explaining
the volatility of unemployment and vacancies only on impact. The estimated dispersion of re-
distributive shocks is relatively low, which provides an improvement over models where labour
market fluctuations are driven by price-elasticity shocks. As far as the endogenous amplifica-
tion mechanisms are concerned, high mean estimates of the replacement ratio provide strong
support in favour of the well known Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) calibration under our pro-
posed shock structure. The estimates of deep habits in consumption are statistically significant
but not sufficiently high to generate amplification in labour market variables. The deep habit
mechanism adds however endogenous persistence and helps generate hump-shaped responses in
output, consumption and inflation. In addition, our model generates the prediction that, due to
the assumptions of nominal price stickiness, TFP innovations reduce employment (on impact)
as well as total hours, while redistributive shocks increase employment and total hours. Finally,
due to the assumptions of nominal price stickiness, deep habits and search frictions, our model
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is able to match the sign of the responses of the labour share to a TFP innovation but it is
unable to replicate labour share overshooting.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the
endogenous amplification mechanisms at work in the model as well as the shock structure of the
model. Section 4 illustrates the estimation strategy, evaluates the quantitative performance of
the model and presents some robustness exercises. The final section concludes. An appendix
complements the paper by providing: a detailed explanation of the dataset; the full set of
the DSGE model equilibrium conditions, linearised equations as well as the derivation of the
deterministic steady state; and an analysis aiming at disentangling the effects of non-standard
modeling features.
2 The Model
The model features labour market frictions, deep habits in consumption, nominal rigidities and
a technology that exhibits constant return to scale technology in both labour and capital. This
type of technology exhibits diminishing marginal returns to each individual factor of produc-
tion. The monetary authority follows a Taylor rule that targets the deviations of inflation
from its steady state value and output growth but it is operationally implemented with some
degree of inertia. The dynamics of the model is driven by seven exogenous AR(1) processes:
two productivity shocks - a TFP shock and a redistributive shock -, a preference shock, an
investment-specific technology shock, a government expenditure shock, a monetary shock and a
matching efficiency shock.
2.1 The Labour Market
The labour market is frictional in that firms fill jobs by posting vacancies at a unit cost. The
technology that matches jobs with workers is given by
mt = m¯tvγt u˜
1−γ
t , (1)
where mt denotes the aggregate flow of hires at time t, u˜t denotes job searchers and vt aggregate
vacancies. The matching efficiency innovation, m¯t, follows an AR(1) process of the form
ln
(
m¯t
m¯
)
= ϱm ln
(
m¯t−1
m¯
)
+ εmt with εmt ∼ N (0, ςm) , (2)
where ϱm is the persistence of the shock and ςm the standard deviation of the innovation εmt.
The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to aggregate
vacancies. At time t, vacancies are filled with probability q (θt) ≡ mt/vt = m¯tθγ−1t , where
θt = vt/u˜t denotes a measure labour market tightness. The assumption of constant returns to
scale in the matching function implies that workers find jobs with probability mt/u˜t = θtq(θt).
Following Ravenna andWalsh (2008) and Blanchard and Gali (2010), we assume that workers
matched with firms at the beginning of time t become immediately productive. The law of motion
for aggregate employment, denoted by nt, can be written as
nt = mt + (1− ρ)nt−1, (3)
where ρ is the exogenous separation rate. The number of searchers are given by
u˜t = 1− (1− ρ)nt−1. (4)
This condition states that the stock of workers searching for a job at time t is given by the
measure of workers who did not have a job at t− 1, 1− nt−1, plus the measure of workers who
lost their job at the end of t− 1, ρnt−1. The unemployment rate is defined as
ut = 1− nt. (5)
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2.2 The Household’s Problem
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical households, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1].
Workers within each households can either be employed or unemployed. While the employed
members of the household at firm i earn a nominal hourly wage rate W jit and suffer disutility
while working hjit amount of hours, the unemployed members receive unemployment benefits
for the amount b¯. We assume that the workers can perfectly insure against idiosyncratic shocks
within the household. Households have preferences over different consumption varieties, indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1]. Following Ravn et al. (2006), we assume that household preferences exhibit external
habit formation in consumption at the good-specific level rather than at the aggregate level. This
consumption externality has been coined as external deep habits or, alternatively, as catching-up
with the Joneses good by good.
Household j solves an intra-temporal and an inter-temporal problem. The former is to
minimise total consumption expenditure,
∫ 1
0 Pitc
j
itdi, subject to the following consumption object
xjct =
[∫ 1
0
(
cjit − ζcscit−1
)1−1/ϵ
di
]1/(1−1/ϵ)
, (6)
where scit denotes the stock of external habit in the consumption of good i at time t, ζc ∈ [0, 1]
the degree of external habit formation of each variety and ϵ the intra-temporal elasticity of
substitution of habit adjusted consumption across varieties. The stock of habits for each variety
i evolves over time according to the following law of motion
scit = ϑcscit−1 + (1− ϑc) cit, (7)
where the parameter ϑc ∈ (0, 1) measures the speed of adjustment of the habit stock to changes
in the average level of consumption of variety i. A value of ϑc equal to 0 implies that the habit
stock exhibits no persistence. By minimising expenditure with respect to cjit, we can derive the
individual consumption demands of variety i by household j
cjit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ϵ
xjct + ζcscit−1, (8)
where Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0 P
1−ϵ
it di
] 1
1−ϵ is the nominal price index and Pit is the price of good i. The
consumption demand for each variety i is decreasing in the relative price of good i, Pit/Pt,
and increasing in both the level of habit adjusted consumption, xjct, and, for positive values of
ζc, in the external level of consumption habits, scit−1. Nominal expenditure in habit adjusted
consumption can be also expressed as Ptxjct =
∫ 1
0 Pit
(
cjit − ζcscit−1
)
di.
The second problem of household j is to maximise his or her lifetime utility by choosing the
consumption object, xjct, and a set of state contingent bonds, D
j
t . The period utility depends
positively on habit-adjusted consumption and negatively on labour supply and it is defined as
U
(
xjct, h
j
it, n
j
it
)
=
[
xjct − ln (zt)
]1−σ − 1
1− σ − χ
∫ 1
0
njit
(
hjit
)1+φ
1 + φ di, (9)
where χ is a constant. The term njit denotes the employment rate by household j. Here, σ
denotes the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution between the consumption
object at time t and t+ 1 and parameter φ the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
The variable zt is a preference shock that evolves according to the following law of motion
ln zt = ϱz ln zt−1 + εzt with εzt ∼ N (0, ςz) , (10)
where ϱz is the persistence of the preference shock and ςz is the standard deviation of the
innovation εzt. As the preference shock enters additively in the utility function, a positive
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preference shock will lead to higher levels of habit adjusted consumption in order to maintain
the same level of utility as in Ravn et al. (2006). The life-time utility of household j is given by
Vt = Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tU
(
xjcτ , n
j
iτ , h
j
iτ
)
, (11)
where Et is the mathematical expectation operator conditional on the information available
at time t and β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. The nominal budget constraint of
household j is given by
Ptx
j
ct+Ptx˜t+Pti
j
t +QtD
j
t = D
j
t−1+
∫ 1
0
W jitn
j
ith
j
itdi+
(
1− njt
)
Ptb¯+Ptrktkjt−1+Φ
j
t +Ptτ¯
j
t , (12)
where x˜ct is equal to ζc
∫ 1
0
Pit
Pt
scit−1di, i
j
t investment in physical capital by the household, the
term (1−njt ) Ptb¯ are the benefits received by the unemployed members of household j, kjt−1 the
amount of physical capital, rkt the real rental rate of capital, Φjt are the aggregate nominal profits
distributed to each household j at time t and τ¯ jt the lump-sum taxes paid by the household to
the government at time t. We denote by Qt the price of the nominal bond, Dt, that pays one unit
of money at maturity. We assume that households face an additional constraint that prevents
them from engaging in Ponzi games. For each household j, the law of motion of employment
evolves according to
njt = (1− ρ)njt−1 + θtq (θt)ujt . (13)
And the law of motion of physical capital is1− κi2
(
ijt
ijt−1
− 1
)2 zitijt = kjt − (1− Γ) kjt−1, (14)
where κi is an adjustment cost associated with changes in investment and zit is an investment-
specific shock that obeys the following exogenous process
ln (zit) = ϱi ln (zit−1) + εit with εit ∼ N (0, ςi) . (15)
Household j maximises (11) by choosing the processes xjct and D
j
t subject to condition (12) and
(14). The household takes Φjt , x˜ct , Pt, D
j
t−1, k
j
t−1 and τ¯
j
t as given. The first order conditions of
this problem are
λjt =
[
xjct − ln (zt)
]−σ
, (16)
and
Qt =
1
Rt
= βEt
λjt+1
λjtπt+1
, (17)
λjtqkt = λt+1βEt
[
rkt+1 + λjt+1 β (1− Γ) qkt+1
]
, (18)
λjt = qktλ
j
tzit

1− κi2
(
ijt
ijt−1
− 1
)2− κi ijt
ijt−1
(
ijt
ijt−1
− 1
)+
+βκiEtqkt+1λjt+1zit+1
(
ijt+1
ijt
)2 (
ijt+1
ijt
− 1
)
, (19)
where πt denotes the gross inflation rate at time t, Rt the policy rate set by the central bank, λjt
and λjtqkt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (12) and (14). The first of these
equations represents the marginal utility of habit adjusted consumption, the second equation
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the standard Euler condition that sets the marginal cost of habit adjusted consumption at time
t equal to the marginal benefit at time t+1, equation (18) is the Euler equation with respect to
capital and, finally, equation (19) describe the relationship between investment dynamics and
the relative price of capital, also known as Tobin’s q.
In addition, the non-arbitrage condition with respect to employment is given by
Wjit =
W jit
Pt
hjit −
b¯+ χ
(
hjit
)1+φ
(1 + φ)λit
+ Etβλjt+1
λjt
(1− ρ)Wjit+1 [1− θt+1q(θt+1)] , (20)
where Wjit denotes the net value to the household of having an additional worker employed at
firm i. The net value of employment to household j is equal to the flow value of employment,
wage income minus the opportunity cost of being employed at firm i, plus the net continuation
value of employment at the firm minus the net value of finding an equivalent job elsewhere whilst
searching for a job at time t. It is worth noting that the aggregate labour market conditions
influence employment at the household level through the job finding rate, θtq (θt).
2.3 The Firm’s Problem
There is a unit mass of monopolistically competitively large firms, each of which produces a
particular variety of the final good i. Each variety i is produced using labour, nithit, and capital
kit−1. The labour input can vary both along the intensive margin, hit, and the extensive margin,
nit, but physical capital can only vary along the extensive margin. We assume that, while firms
can hire workers immediately, firms can only adjust capital at time t + 1. However, due to
the calibration of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply, output adjusts more along the labour
extensive margin. In addition to the TFP innovations we introduce a redistributive shock that
changes the relative factor payments. The production process is given by the following function
yit = cit + git + iit = at (Γhitnit)αt k1−αtit−1 , (21)
where variable yit denotes the output of firm i, git public consumption and αt denotes the elas-
ticity of total output with respect to the labour input. The value of TFP in steady state, a,
is used as a scale factor that normalises output to 1 and the constant Γ controls the extent to
which re-distributional effects affect output directly or indirectly. We will explain extensively in
Subsection 3.1 that these scale factors are of highly important for our analysis. As in Krause
et al. (2008), Di Pace and Faccini (2012) and Michaillat (2012), the production function ex-
hibits decreasing returns to scale in labour input. While these papers assume that employment
is the only input of production, we introduce both physical capital and hours in addition to
employment. The variable αt is the redistributive shock that evolves according to
ln (αt/α) = ϱα ln (αt−1/α) + εαt with εαt ∼ N (0, ςα) , (22)
where α is the steady state elasticity of output with respect to labour, ϱα the persistence of the
shock and ςα the standard deviation of the innovation εαt. The TFP shock follows a stochastic
process of the form
ln (at/a) = ϱa ln (at−1/a) + εat with εat ∼ N (0, ςa) , (23)
where ϱa is the persistence of the technology shock and ςa is the standard deviation of the
innovation εat.
Each firm i faces a consumption demand schedule that can be retrieved from the inter-
temporal maximisation problem of the households. By adding up the cross-sectional individual
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consumption demands, we can recover the demand for good i. Analytically, we simply integrate
expression (8) over j to obtain
cit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ϵ
xct + ζcscit−1, (24)
where xct =
∫ 1
0 x
i
ctdi is a habit adjusted measure of aggregate consumption across households.
The individual demand of good i depends on the sum of a price elastic term, (Pit/Pt)
−ϵ
xct,
and a price inelastic term ζcscit−1. An expansion in aggregate demand increases the weight of
the price elastic term in the demand function, which implies that the price elasticity of demand
for good i is positively related to aggregate demand. Since mark-ups are inversely related to
the price elasticity of demand, the deep habits mechanism predicts that demand/supply shocks
generate counter-cyclical/pro-cyclical movements in mark-ups. The assumption of monopolistic
competition entails that each firm sets their price by taking the prices of all other firms as given.
Unlike the individual demands for private consumption, the demands of public consumption
and investment for each variety are not subject to deep habits and are given by, respectively,
git =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ϵ
gt, (25)
iit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ϵ
it. (26)
Real profits of firm i at time t can be written
ϕit =
Pit
Pt
(cit + git + iit)− witnithit − rktkt−1 − κvvit −Ait,
where wit denotes real hourly wages for newly hired workers, Ait is defined is a quadratic
adjustment costs in output terms associated to price adjustments, κp2
(
Pit
Pit−1π˜pt
− 1
)2
yt, π˜t =
π
ωp
t−1π
1−ωp and ωp is the degree of price indexation to past inflation. The problem of firm i is
to choose the processes cit, scit, Pit and vit so as to maximise the present discounted value of
expected profits,
Et
∞∑
τ=t
Qt,τPτϕiτ ,
subject to the technological constraint, equation (21), the law of motion of employment,
nit = (1− ρ)nit−1 + vitq (θt) (27)
private aggregate demand for good i, equation (24) and the law of motion of the stock of habit,
equation (7). As is standard in the search and matching literature, opening vacancies is costly
in that the resources that could be otherwise devoted to producing the consumption good are
diverted to hiring. The unit costs of vacancy posting are given by κv. Firms open vacancies at
the beginning of each period to potentially match these to job seekers. When posting vacancies,
firm i takes the job filling probability as given by the measure of labour market tightness.
The first order conditions with respect to private consumption, the habit stock, prices,
vacancies and physical capital are respectively:
1
µit
= Pit
Pt
− νcit + (1− ϑc)ψcit, (28)
ψcit = βϑcEt
λt+1
λt
ψit+1 + βζcEt
λt+1
λt
νct+1, (29)
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cit + git (1− ϵ) + git ϵ
µit
+ iit (1− ϵ) + iit ϵ
µit
+ βκpEt
λt+1
λt
Pit+1
Pitπ˜t+1
(
Pit+1
Pitπ˜
p
t+1
− 1
)
yt+1 = νcitxctϵ+
+ Pit
Pit−1π˜t
(
Pit
Pit−1π˜
p
t
− 1
)
yt, (30)
Jit = κv
q (θt)
, (31)
and
rkt = (1− αt) yit
µitkit−1
, (32)
where 1/µit, νcit, ψcit and Jit are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (21), (24),
(7) and (27) respectively. The shadow value of output, denoted by 1/µit, is the contribution
of an additional unit of output to the profits of the firm. Alternatively, we can interpret µit
as a measure of mark-ups, defined as the price of good i over its marginal cost of production.
The first order condition with respect to private consumption, equation (28), sets the inverse of
the mark-up equal to the sum of three components. The first two terms in these two equations
represent the current period revenues associated with a marginal increase in sales. This is equal
to the revenue Pit/Pt, obtained on the marginal sale net of the forgone revenue on inframarginal
quantities, νit. The third component denotes the shadow value of future consumption. Absent
nominal price rigidities, the awareness of high future profits, coupled with the notion that
consumers form habit at the individual level, induces firms to give up current profits in order to
lock-in new consumers into customer/firm relationships. Therefore, firms face a inter-temporal
trade-off between current and future profits (see also Melina and Villa, 2013). Adding nominal
price rigidities changes the pricing incentive of firms and, as it turns out with most models
featuring nominal rigidities, the impact on mark-ups becomes conditional upon the source of
the shock, whether it is a supply-side or a demand-side shock. By adding price rigidities, we can
formulate equation (30) to describe the dynamics of prices under deep habits in an analogous
fashion as the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve.5
In addition, the non-arbitrage condition with respect to employment is
Jit = αt yit
µitnit
− withit + β (1− ρ) λt+1
λt
Jit+1, (33)
where Jit is the marginal value of employment at the firm. This value is equal to the current
flow value of employment, which in turn is equal to the marginal revenue product of employment
minus wage costs, plus the continuation value of employment at the firm. By combining (31)
with (33), we can find an expression for the job creation condition
κv
q (θt)
= αt
yit
µitnit
− withit + β (1− ρ)Etλt+1
λt
κv
q (θt+1)
. (34)
This condition states that firms will expand employment up to the point where the marginal
cost equals the marginal benefit of employing an additional worker. The LHS of equation (34)
measures the expected cost of increasing employment at the margin. Since the adjustment costs
in our set-up are interpreted as forgone output, the expected cost of employment must be equal
to the additional cost of posting a vacancy, denoted by κv, times the average duration of a
vacancy, 1/q (θt). Fluctuations in mark-ups due to deep habits and nominal price rigidities alter
the job creation condition directly.
5See Appendix C for a derivation.
10
2.4 Wage and Hours Bargaining
Wages and hours per worker are determined by maximising the joint surplus of a match following
a Nash bargaining protocol. Formally, hours and wages are negotiated according to the following
bargaining game
max
Wit,hit
WξitJ 1−ξit ,
where ξ is the nominal bargaining power of the worker. In the process of wage negotiation, a
firm-worker pair takes the price level Pt as given so bargaining over the nominal wage makes no
difference relative to wage negotiation over the real wage. In other words, choosing the nominal
wage rate pins down the real wage and viceversa. Without impediments to wage adjustments,
the desired split of the surplus is achieved and this split turns out independent of the unit of
account. The solution to Nash bargaining problem is given by
ξJit = (1− ξ)Wit. (35)
The real wage paid to newly hired workers is
withit = ξ
[
αt
yit
µitnit
+ κβ (1− ρ)Etλt+1
λt
θt+1
]
+ (1− ξ)
[
b¯+ χ h
1+φ
it
λt (1 + φ)
]
. (36)
Unlike in the Walrasian labour market setting, the real wage is a function of the marginal revenue
product of employment, the opportunity cost of replacing the worker and the opportunity cost
of being employed at firm i. The higher the bargaining power of firms, (1− ξ), the higher the
weight on the outside option of the worker, the higher the wages and the lower profits. Hours
per workers are chosen optimally such that the marginal revenue product of labour equals the
marginal rate of substitution
α2t
yit
µitnithit
= χh
φ
it
λt
. (37)
This result implies that hours worked are independent of the hourly wage under Nash bargaining.
2.5 Closing the model
We assume symmetry across firms and households, which entails identical choices for all vari-
ables, and we define aggregate variables as averages. Therefore, we have that nit = njit = nt,
hit = hjit = ht, vit = vt, c
j
it = cit = ct, git = gt, iit = i
j
t = it, kit = k
j
t = kt, scit = sct , µit = µt,
ψcit = ψct , νcit = νct , Pit = Pt, W
j
it = Wit = Wt for all t. All households pay the same taxes,
τ¯t = τ¯ jt .
The model is closed by specifying a monetary rule. The monetary authority is assumed to
set the nominal interest rate Rt following a Taylor interest rate rule of the form:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt
R
)rr [(πt
π
)rπ ( yt
yt−1
)ry]1−rr
exp (εrt) , with εrt ∼ N (0, ςr) , (38)
where rr ∈ (0, 1) captures the degree of inertia in monetary policy with rπ and ry being positive
real numbers. In addition, the government budget constraint is given by
gt +
Rt−1
πt
bt−1 = bt + τ¯t, (39)
where bt are the real risk-free bonds issued by the fiscal authority to finance current government
expenditure . Finally, by adding together the household budget constraints to firms profits, we
derive the following identity
yt = ct + gt + it + κvvt +At. (40)
This market clearing condition simply says that aggregate output is consumed, invested and
also used to pay for both vacancy costs, κvvt, and price adjustment costs, At.
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3 Transmission mechanism
This section disentangles the exogenous and endogenous sources of amplification by studying the
main features of our model. We start our section by examining the role of productivity shocks
as potential exogenous sources. We show that TFP innovations affect output both directly and
indirectly through changes in marginal product of labour, while redistributive innovations affect
output only through changes in the labour demand schedule. Redistributive shocks also have
first order effects on the marginal revenue product of labour via shifts in the labour intensity.
We argue that, as in the standard NK model, the qualitative response of total hours to a TFP
innovation is conditional upon nominal price rigidities but that redistributive shocks always have
a positive impact on employment and hours. We then focus the analysis on the study of the
two main endogenous sources of amplification: deep habits and high income replacement ratios.
Frictions such as deep habits, nominal price rigidities and search and matching break the direct
correspondence between the parameters governing the scale of production and the labour share.
We also show that the labour share depends on a frictional component originating from search
and matching, a measure of mark-ups and on the redistributive innovations.
3.1 The role of productivity shocks
This subsection argues that, while TFP shocks affect production both directly and indirectly,
redistributive shocks have only an indirect effect through changes in total hours. We use the
procedure adopted by Ríos-Rull and Santaeulália-Llopis (2010) to identify productivity shocks
at the good’s level in a model with labour frictions. The assumption in their study that TFP
shocks and redistributive shocks are negatively correlated generates a counter-cyclical labour
share and low volatility in total hours. We assume however that TFP and redistributive shocks
are uncorrelated given that a) our model displays richer dynamics as it includes a more compre-
hensive set of frictions and b) a larger set of shocks is considered.
We first take the production function, equation (21), and apply the natural logarithm to
uncover the effect of the two productivity shocks on output
ln yt = ln at + αt ln (Γntht) + (1− αt) ln kt−1. (41)
We then add and subtract the logarithm of the value of steady state value of y from both sides
of equation (41)
ln yt − ln y = ln at − ln a+ αt ln (Γntht)− α ln (Γnh) + (1− αt) ln kt−1 − (1− α) ln k, (42)
where the variables without the time subscripts correspond to the steady state values. We
then add and subtract αt ln (Γnh) and (1− αt) ln (k) to the RHS of the above expression and
rearrange to get
ât = ŷt − α
(
n̂t + ĥt
)
− (1− α) kˆt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Solow Residual
− α̂t
(
n̂t + ĥt − kˆt−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Re-distributional effect
−α̂t ln
(Γnh
k
)
. (43)
The normalisation point, the chosen value of Γ, in this model turns out to be particularly
important in that we want to isolate the direct impact of redistributive shocks on output and
focus on the indirect impact via changes in the labour input. Thus, we set Γ = k/(nh) such
that any direct effect of redistributive innovations do not enter the log-linearised equation for
output. Equation (43) can be written as
ât︸︷︷︸
TFP Shock
+ α̂t
(
n̂t + ĥt − k̂t−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Redistributive effect
= ŷt − α
(
n̂t + ĥt
)
− (1− α) kˆt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Solow Residual
. (44)
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Up to first order, the product α̂t
(
n̂t + ĥt − kˆt−1
)
is indeed very small and has a negligible direct
impact on output, so the above expression simplifies to
ŷt ≈ ât + α
(
n̂t + ĥt
)
+ (1− α) kˆt−1. (45)
It follows from this expression that TFP shocks have both a direct and an indirect effect on
output due to changes in employment and hours. Absent frictions, Figure 1 shows the direct
impact of a TFP innovation on output – a change in a – but it also shows that a redistributive
shock – a change in α – has a negligible effect on output around the chosen normalisation point.
Unlike the TFP innovation, the redistributive shock affects the curvature of the production
function for a given level of physical capital.
An alternative way to understand the role of productivity shocks in our model is to simply
write the production function in its intensive form as in Solow (1956). Here we divide aggregate
production by physical capital instead. Output per unit of capital can thus be expressed as:
Yt = yt
kt−1
= at
(Γhtnt
kt−1
)αt
= atℓαtt , (46)
where ℓt denotes labour per unit of capital and Yt output per unit of capital. Our definition of
ℓt is simply the inverse of the one adopted in Solow’s seminal work. There are three important
points to notice here. First, the standard TFP shock is a shock to the level of production and
does not affect the curvature of the production function. Second, due to normalisation, the
value of ℓt in the steady state is equal to 1, which means that redistributive shocks do not have
any direct impact on output. Third, since the variable ℓt is the ratio between the factors of
production, a shock that is redistributive implies a change in the relative efficiency of factors.
A higher α induces firms to hire more workers because they are relatively more productive and
physical capital cannot be accumulated on impact.
In order to assess the impact of both productivity shocks on labour demand, let us for now
assume away search and matching frictions and imperfect competition. In such simple setting,
the marginal product of labour is given by αtyt/ (ntht) = wt, where wt is the wage rate. The
labour demand schedule is downward sloping as in models featuring decreasing returns to labour.
The curvature of the labour demand schedule depends on the elasticity of output with respect
to the labour input (α), which in this case it coincides with the labour share. Figure 2 shows
that the impact on the marginal product of labour to a ceteris paribus increase in the relative
labour efficiency – α changing from a value of 0.67 to value of 0.8 – but also shows the impact
on labour demand to a positive TFP innovation – a changing from a value of 1 to a value of 1.1.
The demand curve becomes flatter after a redistributive innovation but maintains its curvature
after a TFP innovation around the normalisation point. The impact on the marginal product
appears to be higher as α increases. Redistributive shocks change the composition to factor
payments, made out of labour and capital income, while standard TFP innovations generate an
increase in both factor payments. An increase in the relative efficiency of labour reduces the
rental rate of capital and the capital share, but increases the wage rate and the labour share.
Both TFP and redistributive shocks affect the marginal revenue product of labour and labour
demand directly. In order to show the impact of both productivity shocks on employment, we
log-linearise the job creation condition and use the optimality conditions to eliminate wage and
hours worked to get
−q̂t = ϖ1
[
ât − µ̂t + (α− 1)
(
n̂t − k̂t−1
)
+ α̂t
]
+
(
ϖ1
α
1 + φ −ϖ3 (1− qξ)
)
λ̂t +
+Et
{
ϖ3 (1− qξ) λ̂t+1 −ϖ3 ̂¯mt+1 +ϖ3 [(1− γ − qξ) θ̂t+1]} , (47)
where ϖ1 = (1−ξ)qκv α
y
nµ , ϖ2 =
(1−ξ)q
(1+φ)κvα
2 y
nµ and ϖ3 = β (1− ρ). This expression shows that pos-
itive productivity innovations shift the marginal revenue product of employment and, therefore,
labour demand.
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The incentive to employ workers for production purposes depends largely on the price setting
assumption - i.e. on the behaviour of mark-ups. When prices are flexible, a positive TFP
innovation increases total hours and wages as in the standard RBC model. Adding nominal
price rigidities leads however to a fall in total hours worked because prices can no longer adjust
downwards to increase aggregate demand. To meet this relative lower level of aggregate demand,
more output can be produced using less labour due to the fact that productivity is higher. This
means that total hours must fall after a TFP innovation (see also Subsection 4.3). After a
redistributive innovation, workers are relatively more efficient at producing output, and therefore
firms have an incentive to employ more workers in equilibrium. In addition, workers are paid
higher wages because their higher relative efficiency increases the marginal product of labour.
Profits per additional hire tend to fall on impact after a TFP productivity shocks but to increase
after a redistributive innovation. This means that while the TFP shock has both a direct and
indirect effects on output, the redistributive shock has only an indirect effect through changes in
labour demand. It is precisely for this reason that, present nominal price rigidities, employment
is likely to expand after a redistributive shock but to contract after a positive TFP innovation.
3.2 Frictions and Endogenous Amplification Mechanisms
We start by examining the determinants of the labour share in the standard New Keynesian
model featuring decreasing returns to labour and redistributive shocks. We then introduce search
and matching frictions to show that the labour share is also a function of a frictional component.
By examining the job creation condition, we study the potential role of deep habits and the so
called Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) (HM) calibration as potential sources of amplification in
the model with frictions.
In the standard New Keynesian model there is a direct link between mark-ups, the wage rate
and TFP innovations. This direct relationship breaks as we relax the assumption of constant
returns in labour. Under the assumption of decreasing returns to labour, the dynamics of
mark-ups depends both on a measure of the labour share and on redistributive innovations
1
µt
= wt
at︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant returns to labour
and 1
µt
= wtHt
αtyt︸ ︷︷ ︸
diminishing returns to labour
, (48)
where Ht = ntht denotes total hours and where µt is a measure of the mark-ups. Moreover, the
labour share is a positive function of the redistributive innovations and a negative function of
mark-ups.
In model featuring search and matching frictions, it is simple to show that, by re-arranging
equation (34), the measure of mark-ups is given by
1
µt
= wtntht
αtyt
1 +
1
wtht
[
κv
q (θt)
− β (1− ρ)Etλt+1
λt
κv
q (θt+1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ft: frictional component
 . (49)
According to this equation, the measure of mark-ups also depends on a frictional component.
This component is a function of the inverse of income per worker and the net savings of employing
an additional worker. For a value of κv equal to zero, the model collapses to a model with
Walrasian labour markets and mark-ups are determined as in equation (48). Re-writing (49),
we get
1
µt
= lst
αt
(1 + ft) , (50)
where lst denotes the labour share. Using the above equation, we can show that the labour
share depends on positively on redistributive shocks and negatively both on mark-ups and the
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frictional component ft
lst =
αt
µt (1 + ft)
. (51)
Note that in models featuring Walrasian labour markets and perfect competition (µ = 1 and ft =
0), αt and the labour share coincide. This is the approach taken by Ríos-Rull and Santaeulália-
Llopis (2010). It follows from (51) that a redistributive shock has a direct impact on the labour
share but also an indirect effect through changes in mark-ups and the frictional component.
Deep habits affects the supply side of the model, the pricing decision of firms and the
behaviour of mark-ups. If fluctuations in the mark-up, µt, induced by the deep habit mechanism,
were relatively large over the cycle, then profits per hire will exhibit a great deal of variation,
which will then generate amplification in labour market variables. The optimal behaviour of
mark-ups under deep habits is given by
1
µt
= 1− νt + (1− ϑ)ψt.
The behaviour of mark-ups depends on two effects: a price elasticity effect and an inter-temporal
effect. After a positive productivity shock, mark-ups exhibit a counter-cyclical behaviour because
the price elasticity increases through a fall in νt and the value of future customer relationships
rises through a higher shadow value of the stock of habits, ψt. The intuition is simply that after
a productivity innovation firms have an incentive to lower prices and to hire more worker to meet
a higher demand for goods. As shown by Di Pace and Faccini (2012), the higher the pricing
effect on demand - the higher ζ and ϑ -, the higher the incentive for firms to hire new workers.
This pricing behaviour is however constrained by the inability of firms to adjust prices optimally.
Persistence in the aggregate price level implies less impact on aggregate demand, production
and labour demand. Thus, the model featuring nominal rigidities and deep habits is less likely
to generate amplification in labour market variables. Moreover, nominal price rigidities alter
the cyclicality of mark-ups according to the nature of shocks: supply/demand shocks tend to
generate pro/counter-cyclical mark-ups.
The second endogenous mechanism that we analyse in this paper is the HM calibration
strategy, which consists of setting value of non-employment utility close to market productivity
as well as very low values to the bargaining power of workers. i.e., a low γ and high total
replacement ratio, defined as b¯/wh+χh(1+φ)/[λ(1+φ)]/wh in the steady state. The higher the
bargaining power of firms, (1− ξ), the higher the weight on the outside option of the worker,
the higher wages and the lower profits. The total replacement ratio can increase because i)
unemployment benefits (b¯) are high, and ii) the degree of habit formation in consumption (ζc)
is low. A rise in b¯ increases the outside option of employment to the worker, making steady
state wages higher and marginal profits per hire lower. A less habitual level of consumption will
increase the disutility of work and the outside option to the worker. Profits per additional hire
tend to be more responsive to TFP innovations when their size is small, leading labour market
variables to exhibit higher variation over the cycle. The deep habit mechanism and the HM
calibration thus appear to be competing forces.6
6An additional source of endogenous source of amplification such as nominal wages rigidities could be easily
added to our framework. In an earlier version of our paper, we introduced nominal wage rigidities but we
decided to exclude it from the final version because, given the shock structure and observables in our model, the
wage adjustment cost parameter was not well identified. The economic intuition as to why amplification can be
generated in the standard model, as pointed out by Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005b), is rather simple. If the
standard model is unable to generate amplification in quantities, then fixing wages will increase the volatility of
vacancies and unemployment by generating larger fluctuations in the flow value of employment at the margin.
The marginal profits per hire will respond more to TFP innovations and firms have a further incentive to post
vacancies when wages are rigid. This simple solution has been criticised on the grounds that the empirical evidence
shows that wages for newly hired worker are highly cyclical. Krause and Lubik (2007) show that introducing real
wage rigidities in the standard search and matching model does not affect the marginal cost of production in
models featuring nominal price rigidities and Nash bargaining. The model with search and matching frictions
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4 Model estimation - Results
This section presents the results of our estimation using Bayesian techniques. Subsection 4.1
discusses the calibration and subsequent estimation of the structural parameters of our model.
Subsection 4.2 investigates the role of the structural shocks at driving the fluctuations of labour
market variables, it compares the model implied volatilities with those in the data and it presents
a counterfactual exercises in which we analyse the role of both endogenous and exogenous sources
of amplification. Subsection 4.3 presents impulse responses to the two productivity shocks and
to the matching efficiency shock. The appendix investigates the role of an exogenous source of
amplification alternative to redistributive shocks.
4.1 Estimation strategy
We estimate the model using Bayesian methods following An and Schorfheide (2007). To solve
the model, we take a first-order (log) approximation of the system of equations around a de-
terministic steady state.7 We use standard methods to solve linear rational expectation models
and then we apply the Kalman filter to evaluate the likelihood function of the observable vari-
ables. The likelihood function and the prior distribution of the parameters are combined to
calculate the posterior distributions. The posterior Kernel is then simulated numerically using
the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm. The posterior distribution of all estimated parameters is
obtained in two steps. First, we use the csminwel algorithm by Christopher Sims to explore
the posterior mode and to approximate the variance-covariance matrix, based on the inverse
Hessian matrix evaluated at the mode, by numerical optimisation on the log posterior density.
Second, the posterior is explored using the random walk Metropolis Hastings algorithm with
two chains of 250,000 draws each. This Markov Chain Monte Carlo method generates draws
from the posterior density and updates the candidate parameter after each draw.8 The model
is estimated for the US over the Great Moderation period, 1984Q1–2007Q4, using the following
observable variables: GDP, investment, consumption, federal funds rate, GDP deflator inflation,
unemployment and vacancies.9 Although observations on all variables are available at least from
1955 onward, we concentrate on this period because it is characterised by a single and unified
monetary policy regime. The number of variables in the data coincides with the number of
shocks in the model.
Our general estimation and calibration strategy follows the standard procedure proposed by
Smets and Wouters (2007) but it is extended to a model with search and matching frictions. In
particular, we calibrate the parameters i) using a priori source of information and ii) to match
some stylised facts over the period of consideration. The time period in the model corresponds
to one quarter in the data. As shown in Table 1, the discount factor, β, is set equal to 0.99,
implying a quarterly steady state real interest rate of 1%. The depreciation rate of physical
capital, δ, is set equal to 0.025. Following the literature, we set the elasticity of substitution of
habit adjusted consumption to 11. The value of elasticity of inter-temporal substitution in the
supply of hours, 1/φ, has been a source of controversy in the literature. Although the business
cycle literature tends to work with elasticities that are higher than microeconomic estimates,
a value greater than 1, most microeconomic studies estimate much smaller elasticities ranging
from 0 to 0.5.10 We set the value of φ to be equal to 5, which corresponds to an Frisch elasticity
displays mark-up dynamics that are disassociated from the behaviour of the real wage for newly hired workers.
This finding is in stark contract with models featuring Walrasian labour markets, where wage rigidities directly
influence the behaviour of mark-ups. Hence, altering the wage dynamics does not affect mark-ups directly due to
the fact that the frictional component offsets any changes to the labour share.
7A log-linearised version of the model can be found in the Appendix.
8See An and Schorfheide (2007) and Fernández-Villaverde (2010) for details.
9See the Appendix for a detailed discussion of data sources, definitions and transformations.
10For a survey of the literature, see Card (1991).
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of labour supply of 0.2. The value of φ is chosen so that output adjusts relatively more over the
extensive labour margin as suggested by the empirical evidence.
We set the unemployment rate equal to 10% and the job filling rate to its long-run targets
in an approach similar to the one taken by Furlanetto and Groshenny (2013). This measure of
unemployment, which is somewhat higher than the data, can be justified by interpreting workers
who are unmatched in the model as being both actively and passively searching for a job. Passive
job seekers, also known as workers marginally attached to the labour force, are those workers that
would be willing to work if they received a job offer. By introducing the alternative measure
of unemployment as proposed by Hall (2005b), we make the assumption that the dynamics
properties of the measure of unemployment as calculated using the standard ILO approach with
this measure coincide. The parameter ξ is chosen to pin down the unemployment rate target.
We set the steady state hours of work at 0.33. In line with Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and den
Haan et al. (2000), we normalise the vacancy-filling rate to 0.70 and find the matching efficiency
parameter, m¯, that attains this target. And, finally, the job separation rate, ρ, is set to 0.1
in line with den Haan et al. (2000) and Shimer (2005). The choice of this parameter is also
based on the observation that around 8 or 10 percent of workers separate from their employer
each quarter (Hall, 1995, p. 235) and the finding by Davis et al. (1996) that this probability is
around 11 percent. The choice of this separation rate implies that jobs last for around 2 and
half years. We set the ratio of vacancies to GDP to be 1% of GDP, a value that is consistent
with Andolfatto (1996), Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Blanchard and Gali (2010). Finally, as
it is standard in the literature, we set the labour share to 0.67. Thus, great ratios are calibrated
in line with the data.
The remaining 28 parameters governing the dynamics of the model are estimated using
Bayesian techniques. The data employed is chosen to add informational content for the es-
timation of the posterior of the different parameters of interest.11 The locations of the prior
mean correspond to a large extent to those in previous studies on the US economy, e.g. Smets
and Wouters (2007). We use the Inverse Gamma (IG) distribution for the standard deviation
of the shocks, setting a loose prior with 2 degrees of freedom, and the Beta distribution for
all parameters bounded between 0 and 1. For parameters measuring elasticities we choose the
Gamma distribution, and for the unbounded parameters the Normal distribution. The priors
chosen are indeed very loose so as to allow the data provide relevant information for estimating
the main parameters of interest. Table 2 shows the prior distributions chosen to estimate the
deep structural parameters.
We find that the estimates of the deep habits and the replacement ratio parameters to be
significantly different from zero. This means that the model favours the presence of the frictions
as possible sources of endogenous amplification. The deep habit parameters are lower compared
to the estimates found by Ravn et al. (2006) and Zubairy (2013), which means that the HM
effect appears to be a priori the main endogeneous driver of labour market amplification. In
addition, models whose deep habit parameters are high suffer from determinacy problems. In
particular, the degree of deep habits in private consumption is 0.60 and the habit persistence is
equal to 0.56. As discussed earlier, nominal price rigidities somehow restrict the extent to which
deep habits can generate amplification in labour market variables. The posterior mean of the
price adjustment cost turns out to be equal to 85.4. There is some evidence of price indexation
similar to Smets and Wouters (2007). The estimate of the posterior mean of the investment
adjustment cost parameter is equal to 3.59.
The estimate of the posterior mean of γ, a value equal to 0.42, is lower than the estimates
used in the literature but closer to the values suggested by Shimer (2005). Since the resulting
value of the ξ is around 0.48. The estimated posterior mean value of the income replacement
ratio, b˜ = b¯/wh, is 0.79. This value corresponds approximately to the upper bound suggested
by Mortensen and Nagypal (2007). The total replacement ratio however is equal to 0.92, which
11Version 4.3.1 of the Dynare toolbox for Matlab is used for the computations.
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is closer to the value set by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). These estimates are suggestive
that a large part of the endogenous amplification in labour market outcomes is driven by the
HM effect. Moreover, the implied value of κ is 0.08.
We find that, during the period of the Great Moderation, the monetary authority was highly
aggressive on inflation and output growth, with posterior mean estimates of around 3.78 and
0.66 respectively. A standard result in models featuring habit formation is a highly inertial
interest rate rule. Our estimations suggests that persistence parameter of the Taylor rule in the
order of 0.87. In the process of estimation, we encounter serious determinacy problems while
adopting reaction functions that targeted deviations of output from its long-run equilibrium. We
attribute this finding to the fact that New Keynesian Phillips curve changes significantly with
the assumption of deep habits because the Phillips curve depends on current and past values
of consumption as shown in equation (52) in the Appendix. A Taylor rule that targets output
growth is more consistent with the model specification under deep habits and, at the same time,
it helps circumvent some of the determinacy problems that are characteristic of sticky price
models featuring search and matching frictions and deep habits.12 Our findings are also line
with with recent studies on the role of fiscal policy under optimal monetary policy.13
The government spending shock and, to a minor extent, the two productivity shocks are
indeed persistent. The standard deviation of the monetary policy shocks is relatively low com-
pared to all other shocks, with the investment-specific shock being the most volatile. The other
two shocks that display high volatilities are the matching efficiency and the government spend-
ing shocks. The estimates of the standard deviations of the remaining parameters are however
maintained within reasonable boundaries. We found that the volatility of the preference shock
is positively related to the parameter measuring the degree of habits. i.e., the higher the degree
of habit formation, the higher the dispersion needed to match the consumption data. However,
the size of this shock is small because the degree of habit formation is relatively lower than
the literature suggests. An advantage of our approach is that the size of the dispersion of the
relevant shocks needed to explain fluctuations in labour market variables is lower than the esti-
mates found in studies featuring other sources of exogenous fluctuations such as price-elasticity
shocks. Figures 3 and 4 show the priors and posteriors of the estimated parameters and the
overall convergence of the estimated model.
4.2 Sources of Amplification
We compute the volatilities of the relevant labour market variables relative to the aggregate
measure of output. Table 3 compares the results generated by the model with moments in the
data over the period of Great Moderation in the US economy. Since the variables in the model are
measured as percentage deviations from the steady state, we detrend both the macroeconomic
aggregates and the labour market variables using a common linear trend given that our method
of estimation assumes a linear trend in the data. A stylised fact in the labour market literature is
the large volatility of unemployment and vacancies, which according to our calculations is about
more than 7 times and 8 times, respectively, more volatile than output in the data. Table 3
reveals that our model can replicate the data reasonably well along this dimension. We attribute
this finding to the fact that not only there is evidence of endogenous sources of amplification
but also that productivity shocks play a key role at matching the second moments of the labour
market data.
We now turn to the analysis of the variance decomposition to assess the importance of ex-
ogenous sources of amplification. The estimation of our model shows considerable heterogeneity
in the analysis of the conditional variance decomposition across the variables of interest over
different horizons. We focus the analysis on a set of labour market variables such as wage,
unemployment, vacancies and hours. As shown in Table 4, TFP shocks explain only part of the
12See Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2010).
13Cantore et al. (2012b) and Jacob (2010).
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variance of labour market variables over a relative short horizon. Redistributive shocks play a
key role for explaining the dynamics of unemployment, vacancies and wages. It is somewhat sur-
prising that these shocks appear to be the single most important exogenous source of variation
for explaining wages for newly hired workers, whilst other shocks have a negligible effect both at
short and long horizons. The conditional variance of unemployment over shorter horizons can
be explained by a combination of shocks with the TFP being the most important exogenous
source of variation after one period. The explanatory power of TFP shocks decays after four
quarters and from then on redistributive shocks turn out the single most important source of
variation. This means that TFP shocks are important for explaining short-run unemployment
but redistributive shocks more important at explaining the variation of long-run unemployment.
We also show in Table 4 the variance decomposition of output and mark-ups. Demand shocks
appear to be an important component of the variation in output over the very short-run but
supply-side shocks can explain the variance of output over time. TFP innovations help explain
about 40% of the variance of output in the longer horizon and well over 50% of the variance of
mark-ups and inflation.
The analysis of the conditional variance decomposition is very similar to the conditional
variance decomposition of unemployment. The unconditional variance decomposition shown
in Table 5 indeed corroborates the importance of redistributive innovations. In particular,
redistributive shocks play an important role at explaining the variance of labour market variables
whilst TFP shocks appear to be important at explaining the variance of mark-ups and output.
The analysis of the unconditional variance decomposition shows that investment-specific shocks
play a non-negligible role, explaining under 10% of the variance of labour market variables and
over than 10% of the variance of consumption, output and hours. The monetary shock however
appears to have a negligible effect on the variables here chosen but it is likely to be a good
predictor of the interest rate and inflation.
Figures 8, 9 and 10 show the historical decomposition of GDP, unemployment and vacancies
respectively during the Great Moderation. These charts confirm previous findings on unemploy-
ment and vacancies: they can mainly be explained by productivity shocks, with redistributive
shocks playing a larger role over the sample period in particular for unemployment. As far as
GDP is concerned, the most important demand shock is the investment-specific shock. The main
drivers of output fluctuations turn out to the two productivity shocks, with TFP shocks being
relatively more important only at the end of the sample period. It is also evident that the two
productivity shocks affecting the goods market have opposing effect over output, unemployment
and vacancies. Productivity shocks capture different exogenous sources of variations over these
three variables.
After studying the exogeneous sources of amplification, we perform a counterfactual exercise
in order to disentangle to which extent the different endogenous sources of amplification can
help explain the relative volatilities of labour market variables. Table 3 shows that, keeping the
long-run targets for unemployment rate and the job filling constant together with the estimated
parameters, the preferred endogenous source of amplification is due to HM. This finding is in line
with Gertler et al. (2008), who find that the HM calibration is important for explaining labour
market dynamics. By shutting down deep habits (DH) and keeping the income replacement
ratio, b¯, equal to its posterior estimate, the model is able to explain nearly all the volatility
in the data. This means that this particular shock structure favours a high replacement ratio
alongside a relative low bargaining power for workers in line with Shimer (2005). Decreasing
the income replacement ratio to 0.45 and setting the DH parameters to zero reduces the relative
volatilities of vacancies by more than half and the relative volatility of unemployment by more
than 1/3. Therefore, the endogenous mechanisms of amplification account for a large part of
the variation in vacancies, while the exogenous sources of amplification help explain a larger
part of the amplification in unemployment. The deep habits mechanisms seem to play a minor
role in terms of labour market amplification. There are two reasons why deep habits are less
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effective at generating amplification: i) the standard TFP innovations play less of a role given
the shock structure of the model; and ii) while the habits parameter are low, the estimates of
the price adjustment costs are reasonably high. However, the mean estimates of the deep habits
in private consumption are statistically different from zero, which means that the deep habits
mechanism is able to capture other properties in the data such as the hump-shaped responses
in output, aggregate consumption, unemployment and to some extent vacancies.14
We run an additional exercise to investigate the role of elasticity of substitution across
varieties. We find that labour market amplification is smaller when the elasticity of substitution
between consumption varieties is smaller because of the behaviour in mark-ups. When we set a
lower ϵ – equal to 5.3 as in Ravn et al. (2006) – the estimated posterior mean of κp also tends to
be lower. On the one hand, this result arises because, when the market power of firms is higher,
firms are likely to have less incentive to adjust their prices and hence their mark-ups optimally.
This corresponds to a suboptimal source of mark-up variation that arises from a lower cost of
nominal price adjustment. On the other hand, when the degree of substitution across varieties is
high, firms would like to adjust their mark-ups more. To match this optimal source of mark-up
fluctuations the estimate of κp has to increase.
4.3 Impulse responses
This section describes the responses of labour market variables following a TFP shock, a redis-
tributive shock and a matching efficiency shock. The rationale behind this choice is that these
are all productivity-type innovations and, thus, have the potential to affect the incentive for
vacancy posting. Moreover, the first two shocks turn out to be the most important drivers of
the labour market variables, as shown by the analysis of the forecast error variance decomposi-
tion at different horizons. One key difference between these shocks is that, while the matching
efficiency shock and the technology shocks can be understood as level shocks, the redistributive
shock is precisely re-distributional in nature. This means that the impact of this shock tends to
shift income between the factors of production whilst it generates limited additional resources.
By dissecting the standard productivity shock into a TFP shock and redistributive shock,
we find that total hours respond differently to the two technological innovations hitting the
goods market. Our findings are consistent with Ríos-Rull and Santaeulália-Llopis (2010) in
that TFP and redistributive shocks have different implications for hours and employment. This
result provides an alternative view to the debate initiated by Galí (1999) on the response of
total hours to technology shocks. He shows using a structural VAR approach that standard
TFP innovations lead to a fall in total hours. This evidence is consistent with the prediction
of the New Keynesian (NK) model but in stark contrast with the conventional real business
cycle model.15 We normalise the shocks to 1 standard deviation in order to assess the order of
magnitude of such shocks on the dynamics of employment, vacancies and other labour market
outcomes.
A positive TFP innovation leads to an increase in output as shown by Figure 5. The TFP
shock reduces inflation and increases mark-ups. The fall in inflation induces the monetary policy
to respond by lowering nominal interest rates, which reduces the real interest rate and increases
aggregate demand and output. Due to the assumption of nominal price rigidities, aggregate
demand is not as responsive to the TFP innovation. Since labour becomes more productive,
aggregate demand can be met by employing less workers and reducing the number of hours
14The Appendix presents the results of the model featuring superficial habits.
15A later study by Christiano et al. (2004) provides empirical support against Gali’s hypothesis that TFP shocks
reduce total hours. A series of later studies by Uhlig (2004), Pesavento and Rossi (2005), Dedola and Neri (2007),
Fernald (2007) and Cantore et al. (2013) propose alternative ways to identify the technological innovation. In line
with the work by Galí (1999) recent studies by Balleer (2012) and Canova et al. (2013) show that employment
falls after a positive TFP shock, while Cantore et al. (2012a) find that the response of hours crucially depends on
the magnitude of the elasticity of capital-labour substitution.
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worked similar to Galí (1999), Pesavento and Rossi (2005) and Fernald (2007). Wages for the
newly hired workers tend to fall on impact but tend to overshoot after the first quarter. The
larger reduction in hours tends to reduce the profits per additional hire further, which reduces
the incentive for vacancy creation at the firm level. Aggregate profits tend to rise due to the
increase in current sales. In line with previous empirical evidence, we find that, although the
labour share falls after a TFP innovation, we observe negligible overshooting of the labour
share.16 We find however that the assumption of nominal price rigidities is able to generate a
counter-cyclical response in the labour share in the presence of search and matching frictions.
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of a redistributive innovation on the variables of interest.
While the responses of most variables are similar to those of the TFP innovation, the effects of
the redistributive shock on labour market variables are substantially different. From the log-
linearised job creation condition, equation (47), it follows that a positive redistributive shock
has a direct effect on the marginal revenue product of employment. The redistributive inno-
vation therefore reduces the job filling rate and increases both the marginal costs and benefits
of employing workers on the margin. The response on hours depends on the fact that α enters
quadratically into the optimality condition for hours, equation (37). The effect of the redis-
tributive shock is larger along the extensive margin relative to the intensive margin. More
re-distribution towards labour shifts the labour demand curve and increases the incentive for
vacancy posting. Our model is able to reconcile the argument that productivity shocks increase
labour demand. Due to the fact that output increases by less than the amount of re-distribution
that takes place between firms and workers, the labour share tends to display a positive and
persistent response. From a quantitative viewpoint, the redistributive shock exerts a lower im-
pact on inflation compared to TFP shock because less output is produced in equilibrium. One
key feature of the redistributive shock is that it has a re-scaling effect on labour but a de-scaling
effect on capital. This means that the production process becomes more labour-intensive but
less capital-intensive. Although on average capital appears to increase, the 95% confident bands
of investment are significantly wider, and the lower band displays a clear negative response. The
reason why on average capital tends to increase is related to the fact that capital adjustment are
costly and take long to adjust. Therefore, we state that the capital has reasonably low de-scaling
effect.
A positive matching efficiency shock increases the productivity of the match between vacan-
cies and workers. As depicted in Figure 7, this innovation increases both the job finding rate
and the job filling rate. An increase in the job filling rate leads to fall in the marginal cost of
hiring, which increases the incentives for job creation. As a result, employment increases and
inflation falls. As it is standard in most models featuring nominal price rigidities, mark-ups and
inflation respond in opposite directions. The increase in employment is however partially offset
by the fall in hours because the marginal rate of substitution falls. This technological shock
reduces the aggregate surplus of the match because both job finding and filling rate increase.
As a result, both marginal profits per additional worker and the wage per worker fall.
5 Conclusions
We assess the role of both exogenous and endogenous sources of amplification for explaining
the volatility of the labour market variables. Our DSGE model featuring labour market fric-
tions, efficient Nash bargaining, deep habits and nominal price rigidities, is able to replicate the
volatilities of unemployment and vacancies as observed in US data. As far as the exogenous
sources of amplification are concerned, we first show that TFP shocks play a role at explaining
fluctuations in labour market variables only on impact. Second, redistributive shocks – which
account for fluctuations in the labour share – are the single most important exogenous source
of variation for generating amplification in unemployment and vacancies over longer horizons.
16See Ríos-Rull and Santaeulália-Llopis (2010).
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Thid, due to a lesser role of TFP innovations and to the presence nominal price rigidities, the
amplification mechanism that involves large mark-up fluctuations indeed play a minor role for
generating endogenous amplification over the period of the Great Moderation. Given the shock
structure of the model, the estimated degree of deep habit formation is relatively lower compared
to the literature, while the estimates of the replacement ratio gives support to Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) type calibration. In addition, the impulse response analysis shows that, while
TFP innovations lead to a contraction in employment and hours, redistributive shocks lead to
an expansion in employment and hours worked. In line with previous evidence, our model also
displays a negative response of the labour share to a TFP innovation.
Our paper sought to shed some light about the role of redistributive shocks on the ampli-
fication of labour market variables. A sensible extension of our study would be to endogenise
the exogeneous sources of variation. Our findings pose a challenge to the use of conventional
production technologies, such as the Cobb-Douglas production, in conjunction with TFP inno-
vations as the sole productivity innovation affecting the goods market for explaining fluctuations
in the labour market variables. Since redistributive shocks appear to be key innovations, our
results are suggestive that the introduction of more general production technologies, such as
the Constant Elasticity of Substitution production function as in, for example, Cantore et al.
(2012a), coupled with both labour and capital augmenting shocks have the potential to match
cyclical properties of labour market variables.
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Appendix
A Data transformation
Data on real personal consumption expenditure (PCE), investment, GDP and the implicit price
deflator of GDP are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data on civilian noninsti-
tutional labour force (LNS11000000Q) and the unemployment rate (LNS14000000Q) are taken
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The fed funds rate is downloaded from the FRED(c)
database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We build a composite measure of the
Help-Wanted Index (HWI) following Barnichon (2010).
Data are transformed following Smets and Wouters (2007) with some minor adjustments.
Consumption is expressed in per worker terms rather than in per capita terms and then logged.
Nominal variables are deflated using the implicit price deflator of GDP. The inflation rate is
computed as a quarter on quarter difference of the log of the implicit GDP deflator. The federal
funds rate is expressed in quarterly terms. We take the log of the unemployment rate and
the log of vacancies. The series on vacancies is computed as a vacancy rate, denoted as the
ratio between total vacancies and the civilian labor force (LNS11000000Q). The vacancy rate is
computed as the product of the composite HWI index and the number of unemployed workers
(LNS13000000Q) in 1987, which is the base year of the HWI.
We add the following measurement equations to establish a link between the observable
variables with the corresponding endogenous variables in our model
dct
dit
dyt
inflt
ffrt
dut
dvt

=

g¯r
g¯r
g¯r
π¯
r
un
un

+

ct − ct−1
it − it−1
yt − yt−1
πt
rt
ût − ût−1
v̂t − v̂t−1

,
where g¯r represents the trend growth rate of consumption, investment and output; π¯ is the net
steady state inflation rate, which is not equal to π, the gross inflation rate; and the bar over the
variables, r and un indicate the sample mean.
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B Tables and graphs
Parameter Description Value
β Discount factor 0.99
c Consumption to GDP ratio 0.67
g Government Expenditure to GDP ratio 0.19
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
α Elasticity of output with respect to labour 0.67
ϵ Elasticity of substitution 11
φ Inv. Frisch elasticity 5
Target Description Value
u Unemployment rate 0.1
q (θ) Job filling rate 0.7
ρ Separation Rate 0.1
Table 1: Calibrated parameters/Targets
Prior Posterior
Parameters Description Distribution Mean Std/df Mean
Structural
ζc Degree of habits Beta 0.5 0.15 0.60 [0.42:0.79]
ϑc Habit persistence Beta 0.5 0.15 0.56 [0.35:0.76]
σ Risk aversion coefficient Normal 2 0.2 2.13 [1.82:2.44]
κp Price stickiness Gamma 60.0 20.0 85.44 [61.39:108.02]
ωp Price indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.17 [0.05:0.27]
κi Investment adj. costs Gamma 2 0.5 3.59 [2.58:4.58]
rπ Taylor rule Normal 2.5 0.75 3.78 [3.12:4.46]
rr Interest rate smoothing Beta 0.5 0.15 0.87 [0.85:0.90]
ry Taylor rule Normal 0.5 0.15 0.66 [0.44:0.85]
b˜ = b¯/wh Income Replacement Ratio Beta 0.4 0.15 0.79 [0.75:0.82]
γ Elasticity of matching w.r.t v Beta 0.5 0.15 0.42 [0.36:0.48]
Shocks
ϱa Technology shock Beta 0.5 0.15 0.87 [0.82:0.92]
ςa IG 0.1 2 0.63 [0.55:0.72]
ϱα Redistributive shock Beta 0.5 0.15 0.90 [0.87:0.93]
ςα IG 0.1 2 1.33 [1.00:1.68]
ϱm Matching efficiency Beta 0.5 0.15 0.63 [0.49:0.78]
ςm IG 0.1 2 2.70 [2.34:3.05]
ϱz Preference shock Beta 0.5 0.15 0.72 [0.56:0.88]
ςz IG 0.1 2 0.32 [0.26:0.37]
ϱzi Investment specific shock Beta 0.5 0.15 0.75 [0.68:0.83]
ςzi IG 0.1 2 3.29 [2.48:4.10]
ϱg Government Spending shock Beta 0.5 0.15 0.97 [0.96:0.99]
ςg IG 0.1 2 2.21 [1.94:2.46]
ςr Monetary policy shock IG 0.1 2 0.14 [0.12:0.16]
Rates
π¯ Inflation rate Gamma 0.625 0.10 0.74 [0.67:0.80]
vn Unemployment and vacancies Normal 0.0 0.3 -0.38 [-0.43:-0.32]
gr Trend Normal 0.4 0.1 0.45 [0.43:0.47]
Log-marginal likelihood -911.57
Table 2: Prior and posterior distributions
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ŷt ît n̂t ût v̂t
Relative standard deviations
US data: 1984-2007 1 3.58 0.53 6.76 8.08
Model (HM + DH) 1 3.85 0.75 6.79 7.56
Model with HM only 1 3.57 0.76 6.80 7.39
Model without endogenous ampl. 1 4.70 0.45 4.00 3.17
Table 3: Relative standard deviations in the data versus the models. DH stands for deep habits, while HM
stands for Hagedorn and Manovskii
Horizon Structural shocks
TFP, Redistrib., Preference, Mon. & fiscal Invest. Matching
ât α̂t ẑt policy, ϵrt, ĝt spec., ẑit effic., ̂¯mt
Output, yˆt 1 9.35 19.95 22.77 39.58 8.04 0.31
4 33.17 28.31 8.16 16.37 13.02 0.97
8 40.27 32.91 4.00 9.84 12.01 0.97
20 42.82 34.38 2.56 7.55 11.98 0.71
40 42.92 33.16 2.45 7.43 13.38 0.66
Mark up, µˆt 1 62.43 12.90 6.76 11.13 0.64 6.13
4 55.77 18.62 5.85 9.88 2.14 7.75
8 55.29 18.79 5.80 9.92 2.50 7.70
20 55.28 18.78 5.81 9.92 2.50 7.71
40 55.28 18.78 5.81 9.92 2.50 7.71
Wage, wˆt 1 9.84 50.74 8.17 17.82 1.94 11.49
4 15.46 68.02 2.44 7.01 2.27 4.80
8 19.48 69.43 1.49 4.51 2.35 2.75
20 22.08 65.62 1.26 4.01 5.11 1.93
40 23.19 61.42 1.28 4.78 7.57 1.77
Unempl., uˆt 1 23.49 22.68 12.71 21.71 5.24 14.17
4 7.84 54.24 6.11 11.65 9.50 10.66
8 12.30 64.19 2.97 6.49 7.65 6.40
20 16.06 66.27 1.98 4.72 6.74 4.23
40 16.88 65.07 1.92 4.68 7.44 4.00
Vacancies, vˆt 1 26.29 25.37 14.22 24.29 5.87 3.97
4 21.40 44.14 7.79 13.73 7.59 5.35
8 21.93 51.66 5.71 10.22 6.56 3.93
20 22.31 54.46 4.79 8.77 6.42 3.25
40 22.61 54.02 4.68 8.64 6.90 3.16
Hours, hˆt 1 50.35 2.99 11.11 24.02 3.28 8.24
4 42.74 2.82 10.18 27.48 7.50 9.28
8 39.19 3.62 9.52 32.68 7.21 7.79
20 33.03 3.78 7.57 39.98 9.79 5.86
40 29.93 3.09 6.24 43.46 12.60 4.69
Table 4: Conditional variance decomposition at different horizons
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yˆt cˆt nˆt hˆt µˆt uˆt vˆt wˆt lˆst
ât 42.94 21.62 17.07 28.03 55.28 17.07 22.70 23.30 20.91
α̂t 32.76 29.63 64.68 2.88 18.78 64.68 53.83 59.73 72.00
ert 0.58 0.25 1.49 0.05 5.13 1.49 2.96 1.87 2.15
ẑt 2.45 6.59 1.92 5.65 5.81 1.92 4.67 1.28 1.44
ĝt 6.80 30.97 3.18 46.65 4.79 3.18 5.66 3.97 0.98
ẑit 13.81 10.56 7.68 12.53 2.50 7.68 7.04 8.13 1.09̂¯mt 0.65 0.37 3.97 4.21 7.71 3.97 3.15 1.72 1.42
Table 5: Unconditional variance decomposition (in percent)
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Figure 1: Production function. The blue line shows the baseline production function. The green line shows how
redistributive shocks affect the curvature of the production function and the red shows changes in the shape of
the production function as the level of technology increases.
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Figure 2: Marginal product of labour in a model with Walrasian labour markets. The blue line denotes the
demand function in the baseline case. The green line shows how labour demand changes after a redistributive
shock.
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Figure 3: Priors and posteriors of estimated parameters
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Figure 4: Overall convergence of the model. “Interval" is constructed from an 80% confidence interval around
the parameter mean, “m2" is a measure of the variance and “m3" is based on third moments. The horizontal
axis represents the number of Metropolis-Hastings iterations undertaken, and the vertical axis the measure of the
parameter moments, with the first, corresponding to the measure at the initial value of the Metropolis-Hastings
iterations.
33
5 10 15
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
yˆt
5 10 15
0
1
2
µˆt
5 10 15
−0.5
0
0.5
wˆt
5 10 15
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
pˆit
5 10 15
−10
−5
0
5
vˆt
5 10 15
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
nˆt
5 10 15
−4
−2
0
2
4
uˆt
5 10 15
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
hˆt
5 10 15
0
10
20
φˆt
5 10 15
−60
−40
−20
0
φˆnt
5 10 15
1
2
3
4
iˆt
5 10 15
−2
−1
0
lˆst
Figure 5: Technology shock. Solid lines represent mean IRF and dashed lines represent the 95% confidence
intervals. The size of the shock is normalized to one standard deviation.
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Figure 6: Redistributive shock. Solid lines represent mean IRF and dashed lines represent the 95% confidence
intervals. The size of the shock is normalized to one standard deviation.
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Figure 7: Matching efficiency shock. Solid lines represent mean IRF and dashed lines represent the 95%
confidence intervals. The size of the shock is normalized to one standard deviation.
35
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
8
ea            
ef            
er            
ez            
eg            
ei            
em            
Initial values
Figure 8: Historical decomposition of GDP.
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Figure 10: Historical decomposition of vacancies
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C Model, Log-linearised Equations and Steady State
C.1 Baseline Model
mt = m¯tvγt u˜
1−γ
t ,
ln
(
m¯t
m¯
)
= ϱm ln
(
m¯t−1
m¯
)
+ εmt,
q (θt) = mt/vt,
nt = mt + (1− ρ)nt−1,
u˜t = 1− (1− ρ)nt−1,
ut = 1− nt,
λt = [xct − ln (zt)]−σ ,
xct = ct − ζcsct−1,
ln (zt) = ϱz ln (zt−1) + εzt,
1 = βRtEtβt,t+1/πt+1,
λtqkt = βEtλt+1 [rkt+1 + (1− δ) qkt+1] ,
λt = qktλtzit
{[
1− κi2
(
it
it−1 − 1
)2]− κi itit−1 ( itit−1 − 1)
}
+
+βκiEtqkt+1λt+1zit+1
(
it+1
it
)2 ( it+1
it
− 1
)
,
ln (zit) = ϱi ln (zit−1) + εit,
Wt = wtht −
[
b¯+ χ (ht)1+φ / [(1 + φ)λt]
]
+ (1− ρ)Etβt,t+1Wt+1 [1− θt+1q(θt+1)] ,
yt = at (∆htnt)αt k1−αtt−1 ,
ln (at/a) = ϱa ln (at−1/a) + εat,
ln (αt/α) = ϱα ln (αt−1/α) + εαt,
yt = ct + gt + it + κvvt + κp2 (πt/π˜
p
t − 1)2 yt
kt = zitit
[
1− κi2
(
it
it−1 − 1
)2]
+ (1− δ) kt−1,
sct = ϑsct−1 + (1− ϑc) ct,
ln (gt/g) = ϱg ln (gt−1/g) + εgt,
1/µt = 1− νct + (1− ϑc)ψct,
ψct = ϑcEtβt,t+1ψct+1 + ζcEtβt,t+1νct+1,
ct + gt (1− ϵ) + gt ϵµt = νctxctϵ+ πt/π˜
p
t (πt/π˜
p
t − 1) yt − κpEtβt,t+1πt+1/π˜pt+1
(
πt+1/π˜
p
t+1 − 1
)
yt+1−
(1− ϵ) it − ϵ itµt ,
rkt = (1− αt) ytµtkt−1 ,
Jt = αtyt/ (µtnt)− wtht + (1− ρ)Etβt,t+1Jt+1,
Jt = κ/q (θt) ,
wtht = ξ [αtyt/ (µtnt) + κv (1− ρ)Etβt,t+1θt+1] + (1− ξ)
{
b¯+ χ (ht)1+φ / [(1 + φ)λt]
}
,
χhφt /λt = α2t yt/ (µtntht) ,
Rt
R∗ =
(
Rt
R∗
)rr [( πt
π∗
)rπ ( yt
yt−1
)ry]1−rr
zrt,
ln (zrt) = ϱr ln (zrt−1) + εrt.
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C.2 Log-linearised equations
m̂t = m̂t + γv̂t + (1− γ) ̂˜ut,̂¯mt = ϱm ̂¯mt−1 + εmt,
q̂t = ̂¯mt + (γ − 1) θ̂t,
θ̂t = v̂t − ̂˜ut,
m̂t = 1ρ [n̂t − (1− ρ) n̂t−1] ,̂˜ut = − (1−ρ)nu˜ n̂t−1,
ût = −nu n̂t,
λ̂t = −σ (x̂ct − ẑt) ,
(1− ζc) x̂ct = ĉt − ζcŝct−1,
ẑt = ϱz ẑt−1 + εzt,
λ̂t = R̂t + Et
[
λ̂t+1 − π̂t+1
]
,
q̂kt = Et
[
λ̂t+1 − λ̂t + r̂kt+1
]
+ β (1− δ)Et [q̂kt+1 − r̂kt+1] ,
ît = ît−1 + 1κi(1+β) (q̂kt + ẑit) +
β
1+βEtît+1,
ẑit = ϱiẑit−1 + εit,
ŷt = ât + α
(
n̂t + ĥt + α̂t
)
+ (1− α) k̂t−1,
ât = ϱaât−1 + εat,
α̂t = ϱαα̂t−1 + εαt,
ŷt = cy ĉt +
g
y ĝt +
i
y ît +
κv
y v̂t,
k̂t = δ
(
ẑit + ît
)
+ (1− δ) k̂t−1,
ŝct = (1− ϑc) ĉt + ϑcŝct−1,
ĝt = ϱgĝt−1 + εgt,
− 1µ µ̂t = −νcν̂ct + (1− ϑc)ψcψ̂ct,
ψ̂ct = Etλ̂t+1 − λ̂t + βϑcEtψ̂ct+1 + βζcνcψc Etν̂ct+1,
c
y ĉt + (1− ϵ) iy ît + ϵ iy 1µ
(
ît − µ̂t
)
+ (1− ϵ) gy ĝt + ϵ gy 1µ (ĝt − µ̂t) + βκpEt [π̂t+1 − ωπ̂t] =
νcxcϵ
y (ν̂ct + x̂ct) + κp (π̂t − ωπ̂t−1) ,
r̂kt = (1− α)
(
ŷt − k̂t−1 − α1−α α̂t
)
,
−J q̂t = α aµ∆hα
[
ât − µ̂t + α̂t + (α− 1) n̂t + αĥt + (1− α) k̂t−1
]
−
−wh
(
ŵt + ĥt
)
+ β (1− ρ)JEt
[
λ̂t+1 − λ̂t − q̂t+1
]
,
wh
(
ŵt + ĥt
)
= ξ
{
αy/ (µn) [α̂t + ŷt − (µ̂t + n̂t)] + κv (1− ρ) θEt
(
λ̂t+1 − λ̂t − θ̂t+1
)}
+
+(1− ξ)χ (h)1+φ / [(1 + φ)λ]
[
(1 + φ) ĥt − λ̂t
]
,
φĥt − λ̂t = 2α̂t + ŷt −
(
µ̂t + n̂t + ĥt
)
,
R̂t = rrR̂t−1 + (1− rr)[rpπ̂t + ry (ŷt − ŷt−1)] + zrt,
ẑrt = ϱrẑrt−1 + εrt .
D Phillips Curve
The Phillips curve under deep habits can be written as
π̂t =
β
1 + βωEtπ̂t+1 +
ω
1 + βω π̂t−1 +
ν (1− ζ) cϵ
(1 + βω)κpy
(x̂t + ν̂t)−
− 1(1 + βω)κp
[
c
y
ĉt + (1− ϵ) i
y
ît + ϵ
i
y
1
µ
(
ît − µ̂t
)]
. (52)
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E Steady State
u = 0.1,
q = 0.7,
n = 1− u,
u˜ = 1− (1− ρ)n,
h = 1,
y = 1,
v = ρnq ,
m¯ = q
(
v
u˜
)1−γ
,
m = ρn,
R = πβ ,
rk = π/β − (1− δ),
qk = 1,
Γc = (1− ϑcβ) / [(1− ϑcβ)− (1− ϑc) ζcβ] ,
k = (1− c− g − C) /δ,
a = 1/k,
µ = [ϵδk + ϵ (1− ζc) cΓc + ϵg) / [ϵ (1− ζc) cΓcc− (1− ϵ) g − (1− ϵ) kδ] ,
νc = (1− 1/µ) Γc,
ψc = ζcβ(1−ϑcβ)(1−ζc)νc ,
α = 1− rkµk,
∆ = k/ (nh) ,
i = δk,
whn
y =
1
µα− Cρ [1− β (1− ρ)] ,
κ = Cyv ,
w = wnhyyhn ,
ξ = (
1−b¯)wnhy − α
2
µ(1+φ)
1
µ
α− α2
µ(1+φ)−b¯wnhy +β(1−ρ)C nu˜
,
χ = α2y [c (1− ζ)]−σ / [µnh (hφ)] ,
χ = α
2(nh)α−1[c(1−ζ)]−σ
µhφ ,
b¯ = b˜wh,
sc = c,
xc = (1− ζc) c,
λ = x−σc ,
θ = vu˜ .
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F Superficial habits in private consumption
This section analyses the effects of superficial habits in private consumption instead of the deep
habits setting presented in the paper in order to: (i) investigate the role of a different type of
habit formation; and (ii) analyze the robustness of the main results.
In the DSGE model the presence of superficial external habits in consumption simplifies the
optimization problem of households. They solve only the standard problem of maximise utility,
and the consumption object, xjct, is simply equal to:
xjct = c
j
t − ζscct−1 (53)
where ζsc denotes the external habit parameter and ct−1 aggregate consumption. The problem
of firm i becomes standard as it chooses prices, vacancies and physical capital to maximise the
present discounted value of expected profits subject to the production function and the law of
motion of employment. In the presence of superficial habits, the price elasticity of demand is
constantly equal to the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. Hence, firms no longer face the
inter-temporal trade-off between current and future profits.
We estimate the model featuring superficial instead of deep habits using Bayesian techniques.
Calibrated parameters are the same as in Table 1, while Table 6 shows the mean estimates of
the remaining parameters. Overall parameters are remarkably similar across the two models
since in all cases the median estimate of a parameter in the model with deep habits falls in the
estimated confidence band for the same parameter of the model with superficial habits. The
mean value of price stickiness is somewhat higher in the latter model and the high estimate
of the income replacement ratio is confirmed. A log-likelihood comparison reveals that there
is strong evidence in favour of the model featuring deep habits (see Kass and Raftery, 1995,
for details). It should be noted that superficial habits do not display an exogenous persistent
component. A proper Bayesian comparison with the model featuring deep habits could include
this component.
The better fit of the deep habits model is evident from the analysis of the simulated moments.
Table 7 shows that the model with superficial habits is still able to generate high volatilities
of unemployment and vacancies, equal to 6.31 and 7.04 respectively. But the comparison be-
tween Table 7 and Table 3 reveals that the model featuring deep habits gets closer to the data,
although the difference between the two models is not striking. In addition, Table 7 confirms
the dominant role of the Hagedorn and Manovskii effect as the most important endogenous
mechanism accounting for labour market amplification.
As far as the exogenous sources of labour market amplifications are concerned, Tables 8 and
9 confirm the results of the model featuring deep habits: redistributive shocks play a major role
in explaining the variability of unemployment and vacancies at both short and long horizons.
This exercise has shown that the two following results of the model are robust to the mechanism
of habit formation: (i) the HM effect is a powerful source of endogenous amplification of labour
market variables; and (ii) redistributive shocks largely explain the variability of these variables.
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Prior Posterior
Parameters Description Distribution Mean Std/df Mean
Structural
ζsc Habit parameter Beta 0.5 0.15 0.39 [0.23:0.55]
σ Risk aversion coefficient Normal 2 0.2 2.16 [1.88:2.47]
κp Price stickiness Gamma 60.0 20.0 92.65 [67.06:118.04]
ωp Price indexation Beta 0.5 0.15 0.22 [0.08:0.36]
κi Investment adj. costs Gamma 2 0.5 3.60 [2.64:4.57]
rπ Taylor rule Normal 2.5 0.75 3.72 [3.05:4.38]
rr Interest rate smoothing Beta 0.5 0.15 0.86 [0.83:0.89]
ry Taylor rule Normal 0.5 0.15 0.66 [0.46:0.86]
b˜ = b¯/wh Income Replacement Ratio Beta 0.4 0.15 0.79 [0.76:0.82]
γ Elasticity of matching w.r.t v Beta 0.5 0.15 0.42 [0.35:0.48]
Shocks
ϱa Technology shock Beta 0.5 0.15 0.88 [0.84:0.93]
ςa IG 0.1 2 0.67 [0.58:0.75]
ϱα Redistributive shock Beta 0.5 0.15 0.88 [0.86:0.91]
ςα IG 0.1 2 1.28 [0.97:1.58]
ϱm Matching efficiency Beta 0.5 0.15 0.67 [0.54:0.82]
ςm IG 0.1 2 2.70 [2.34:3.05]
ϱz Preference shock Beta 0.5 0.15 0.70 [0.54:0.86]
ςz IG 0.1 2 0.32 [0.27:0.37]
ϱzi Investment specific shock Beta 0.5 0.15 0.77 [0.70:0.84]
ςzi IG 0.1 2 3.24 [2.46:3.99]
ϱg Government Spending shock Beta 0.5 0.15 0.97 [0.95:0.99]
ςg IG 0.1 2 2.21 [1.95:2.47]
ςr Monetary policy shock IG 0.1 2 0.14 [0.12:0.16]
Rates
π¯ Inflation rate Gamma 0.625 0.10 0.74 [0.67:0.80]
vn Unemployment and vacancies Normal 0.0 0.3 -0.38 [-0.44:-0.31]
gr Trend Normal 0.4 0.1 0.46 [0.44:0.47]
Log-marginal likelihood -916.48
Table 6: Prior and posterior distributions in the model with superficial habits
ŷt ît n̂t ût v̂t
Relative standard deviations
US data: 1984-2007 1 3.58 0.53 6.76 8.08
Model (HM + SH) 1 3.75 0.70 6.31 7.04
Model with HM only 1 3.71 0.70 6.30 6.96
Model without HM and SH 1 4.65 0.42 3.74 2.88
Table 7: Relative standard deviations in the data versus the models. SH stands for superficial habits, while HM
stands for Hagedorn and Manovskii
yˆt cˆt nˆt hˆt µˆt uˆt vˆt wˆt lˆst
ât 53.19 30.73 22.62 31.83 57.38 22.62 25.15 32.46 17.87
α̂t 26.60 26.05 59.09 5.07 16.17 59.09 54.96 52.92 76.16
ert 0.43 0.26 1.20 0.04 6.61 1.20 2.93 1.59 2.19
ẑt 1.84 4.73 1.72 4.52 7.12 1.72 4.56 0.98 1.60
ĝt 5.06 26.70 2.46 42.00 4.92 2.46 4.26 3.48 0.75
ẑit 11.88 10.84 6.77 12.59 1.54 6.77 6.03 7.56 0.59̂¯mt 1.01 0.69 6.14 3.95 6.27 6.14 2.10 1.00 0.84
Table 8: Unconditional variance decomposition (in percent)
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Horizon Structural shocks
TFP, Redistrib., Preference, Mon. & fiscal Invest. Matching
ât α̂t ẑt policy, ϵrt, ĝt spec., ẑit effic., ̂¯mt
Output, yˆt 1 21.53 26.73 17.70 28.14 4.83 1.09
4 44.65 30.76 5.86 9.15 7.82 1.77
8 49.56 30.61 3.00 6.26 9.08 1.50
20 52.59 28.28 1.99 5.50 10.55 1.09
40 53.12 26.92 1.86 5.52 11.56 1.02
Mark up, µˆt 1 63.36 12.99 6.55 12.12 0.28 4.71
4 57.72 16.09 7.15 11.55 1.22 6.26
8 57.40 16.18 7.12 11.53 1.52 6.26
20 57.39 16.17 7.12 11.53 1.53 6.27
40 57.38 16.17 7.12 11.53 1.54 6.27
Wage, wˆt 1 2.19 63.77 8.19 17.61 0.75 7.48
4 21.47 67.27 2.16 5.66 1.00 2.43
8 26.38 65.49 1.38 3.73 1.52 1.50
20 30.58 59.30 1.06 3.39 4.56 1.11
40 32.27 54.63 1.00 4.08 6.99 1.03
Unempl., uˆt 1 10.92 33.99 12.51 18.69 3.25 20.64
4 57.72 16.09 7.15 11.55 1.22 6.26
8 15.51 62.85 2.58 4.31 5.55 9.21
20 20.94 61.16 1.81 3.63 5.94 6.51
40 22.35 59.50 1.73 3.67 6.56 6.19
Vacancies, vˆt 1 13.45 41.85 15.40 23.02 4.01 2.27
4 19.59 54.41 7.27 10.44 5.01 3.28
8 22.01 56.66 5.55 8.17 5.05 2.56
20 24.24 56.12 4.71 7.30 5.46 2.16
40 24.99 55.20 4.58 7.22 5.90 2.11
Hours, hˆt 1 51.20 6.29 10.28 21.76 2.95 7.52
4 42.02 8.29 10.07 23.41 7.17 9.03
8 39.48 8.50 8.55 28.64 7.23 7.60
20 35.43 6.79 6.41 36.48 9.24 5.64
40 33.30 5.48 5.04 39.26 12.50 4.42
Table 9: Conditional variance decomposition at different horizons in the model featuring superficial habits
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G The role of an alternative exogenous innovation
In this section we analyse the role of price mark-up shocks in a model where redistributive shocks
are absent.
The reason why mark-up shocks are introduced is that with diminishing returns to labour,
these shocks turn out to be also redistributive between factors of production and firm’s aggregate
profits. Rotemberg (2008) argues that amplification in labour market frictions can be generated
through mark-up shocks:
While variations in market power emerge as an attractive source of aggregate fluc-
tuations in employment, the particular source of these variations considered here
does not. In particular, the variations in the elasticity of demand that are needed to
explain employment fluctuations are too large.17
In order to verify Rotemberg’s claim, we substitute redistributive shocks with mark-up shocks
in an otherwise identical model and find that the posterior mean estimates of the dispersion of
the mark-up shocks necessary to generate amplification as in the US data is indeed very large.
Krause et al. (2008) estimate a NK model using Bayesian techniques but they are silent about
the size of the price-elasticity shocks needed to match the volatility in the data. We find that
with a calibration of ϵ = 11, a dispersion of 19 (19%) is needed to generate these results – and
the posterior mean of the estimated standard deviation coincides with the x-axis. The size of
the standard deviation of the price-elasticity shock is unrealistically too large. To gain intuition
as to why price-elasticity shocks are indeed too volatile, we strip out the model from nominal
rigidities and deep habits but maintain the assumption of search and matching frictions. As
pointed out in Section 3, the labour share can be expressed as a function of mark-ups as well as
a frictional component. In a model featuring monopolistic competition, the mark-up measure
is given by ϵt/ (ϵt − 1), where ϵt is the time-varying price-elasticity of demand that follows an
AR(1) process. This means that a simple log-linearisation of the measure of mark-ups in a model
driven by price-elasticity shocks implies that
µˆt =
−ϵˆt
ϵ− 1 . (54)
In Section 3, we found an inverse relationship between mark-ups, the labour share and labour
market amplification given by the frictional component. For values of ϵ equal to 11, then ϵ− 1
term is equal to 10. This means that the standard deviation of the price-elasticity needed to
generate sufficient amplification must be more than 10 times as volatile as the baseline model
featuring redistributive shocks. The lower the value of ϵ, the lower the dispersion needed to
match the amplification in labour market variables.
Although price-elasticity and redistributive shocks enter in the job creation condition in a
similar way, there are at least three important differences between these two model specifications.
The first point of difference is conceptual: while mark-up shocks affect the market power of firms
operating in a given economy, leaving unaffected the shares between labour income and capital
income, redistributive shocks change directly the shares between labour income and capital
income – leaving the degree of market power unchanged. The deep habit model gives rise to an
endogenous source of variation in the market power variation due to the fact that firms have the
incentive to price goods in order to build up their customer base. A second point of difference
is that a redistributive shock affects the rate of return of capital and capital accumulation. A
third point of divergence is the effect of mark-up shocks on inflation. While price-elasticity
shocks affect directly the inflation rate via the Phillips curve, redistributive shocks however
affect inflation only indirectly through changes in production.
17See Rotemberg (2008), page 33.
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